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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

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GRADE 12

HISTORY P2

NOVEMBER 2024

ADDENDUM

This addendum consists of 14 pages.

QUESTION 1: HOW DID CIVIC ORGANISATIONS MOBILISE LOCAL COMMUNITIES TO RESIST THE APARTHEID GOVERNMENT'S STRUCTURES IN SOUTH AFRICA IN THE 1980s?

SOURCE 1A

The source below was written by D Zelenova, a research fellow at the Institute for Social Policy and faculty member of the Higher School of Economics in Russia. It explores the reaction of the civic organisations to the Black Local Authorities Act.

The government introduced the Black Local Government Bill in 1980. After much discussion and revision, the bill was finally passed into law in 1982 as the Black Local Authorities Act. It provided for the establishment of a series of local government structures similar to those operating in the white areas and for the first time [it] gave African residents of urban locations something like autonomy (self-government). 'If they could not have access to Parliament, at least they now had local power, elected by local residents.' Councillors were responsible for township administration on budgets raised by local rents and levies (taxes).


As a reaction to the Black Local Authorities Act, civic organisations mushroomed (grew). The civics were, in short, residents' associations that dealt with the concerns of the people. These local committees that emerged in the late 1970s and proliferated (multiplied) in the 1980s, centred on ordinary township residents, often without political experiences or organising and facilitating skills. Civics interacted in different ways with more localised forms of self-organisation, like block, yard and street committees. These were formed to tackle specific problems such as high rentals, poor electrification, bad housing, the bucket-toilet system and crime.

'The conditions that caused the formation of these organisations were bread-and-butter issues, but addressing these (bread-and-butter) issues automatically drove them (civic organisations) to political issues. 'Through popular questions, like "Why are the streets dirty?", "Why are we renting houses?" people got politicised and conscientised,' said Moses Mayekiso, a leader of the Alexander Action Committee.

[From *Anarcho-Syndicalist Review*, an independent labour magazine, 2 October 2017]

SOURCE 1B

The poster below, produced by the Krugersdorp Residents' Organisation, appeared on *South African History Archive*. It called for the residents' meeting to be held at the Roman Catholic Church in Kagiso on 27 January 1985. .



[From 'Images of Defiance', South African resistance posters of the 1980s by the Krugersdorp Residents' Organisation]

SOURCE 1C

The extract below is from *Zwelethu Our Land – A Memoir* by J Seroke, the Pan Africanist and cadre of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), published in 2021. It focuses on the Thembisa rent boycott in the mid-1980s and the reaction of the state to those perceived to be its leaders.

In the 1980s, the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) pitched up to lead action supporting the rent and services complaints of the Thembisa residents, and a boycott was agreed on. The residents marched out of the meeting and onto the streets to mobilise other community members.

In the early hours of the following day, I, (Jaki Seroke) was picked up at home by my old adversary (enemy), South African Police officer, Van Niekerk, and detained (jailed) under the General Law Amendment Act. This allowed for fourteen days' detention while the police worked out a charge. The detainee could be held in solitary confinement (isolation) and was not allowed access to lawyers or a doctor during that time. The fourteen days could be extended indefinitely (without end), until the person was charged, or police decided to release them. This law was a modified (altered) version of the Sobukwe Clause, under which Robert Sobukwe, founder of the PAC, was kept in isolation on Robben Island for a year, and in his case, this repeated for nine years.

I had read up the detention laws and educated myself about a few rights I had. I also knew that I had a right to ask for the written regulations. I was taken to Kempton Park Police Station for detention. The officers put us two to a cell, I had David Makgapa, who briefed me about the developments that led to the call for rent boycott. Those opposing the boycott were people wanting to serve as councillors and puppets of the township superintendent (administrator).

[From *Zwelethu Our Land – A Memoir* by J Seroke]

SOURCE 1D

The extract below is from the *Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Report* published on 29 October 1998. It explains how civic organisations that were at the forefront of protest action in townships faced violent repression from the South African government.

Rent boycotts were launched in townships across the Vaal following the announcement of rent increase by black local authorities, now under some pressure to meet their budget deficits (shortfalls) and become self-financing. Township residents could not afford to pay the rapidly escalating (rising) rents they were expected to pay. The 56 per cent rent increase announced by the Lekoa Town Council affected at least 300 000 people in the Vaal who were already paying some of the highest rents in the country, half of which were in arrears.

Opposition organised through civic and student organisations proliferated (multiplied). Attacks on councillors trying to implement the rent increase by black local authorities, intensified (grew), leading to the resignation of many in 1984. Between January 1985 and July 1986, rent boycotts were launched in Ratanda, Katlehong, Mamelodi, Alexandra, Tembisa, Soweto, Vosloorus and Krugersdorp. By August 1987, it was estimated that rent boycotts in the PWV (Pretoria, Witwatersrand and Vereeniging) had cost more than R188 million.

Violent government reaction to rent protests culminated (ended) in police shooting on marchers on 21 November 1985 in Mamelodi where thirteen people died. Most victims were shot in the back. Captain Le Roux of the South African Police (SAP), who participated in the shooting, told the 1989 inquest hearing that the police had adopted a shoot-to-kill approach. The Mamelodi massacre radicalised (revolutionised) the township community. In the Vaal, the violent response of the police to the rent escalated (heightened) the protest and opposition rather than curbing (reducing) it.

[From *TRC Final Report*, Volume 3, Chapter 6, Subsection 42]

QUESTION 2: WAS THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (TRC) ABLE TO BRING CLOSURE TO SIZWE KONDILE'S FAMILY FOR HIS MURDER AS AN ANTI-APARTHEID ACTIVIST IN 1981?

SOURCE 2A

The source below is an extract from the *Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report*, published in 1998. It highlights Sizwe Kondile's political life and how he fled to exile in Lesotho in 1980.

Mr Gcinisizwe 'Sizwe' Kondile was a Port Elizabeth activist and a founder member of the Congress of South African Students (COSAS). In contact with the African National Congress (ANC) in Lesotho, Kondile and five others formed an underground ANC cell inside the country in about July 1980.

When two members of the cell – Mr Thembi Mbiyabo and Mr Nangamso Ndzube – were arrested, Kondile and the other cell members (Mr Vusumzi Pikoli, Mr Thozu Majola and Mr Phaki Ximiya) decided to leave the country in September 1980. They went to Maseru, Lesotho, where they met with former Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO) leader Mr Thozamile Botha and Mr Chris Hani. They were given basic training and told to build the underground movement in the Eastern Cape. This involved moving back and forth between Lesotho and South Africa.

Kondile went into South Africa on a brief mission in June 1981, and returned safely to Maseru, the capital city of Lesotho, in the same month. Later that month he disappeared from Maseru. The South African Police claimed that Kondile had been arrested in Port Elizabeth on 26 June 1981, but had been released in August 1981. Because he had borrowed Chris Hani's car on the day he disappeared, the ANC suspected him of being a traitor, and the family suffered political isolation and trauma (shock) as a result of this.

[From the *Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report*, Vol. 3, 1998]

SOURCE 2B

The extract below is from a book titled, *COMING TO TERMS – SOUTH AFRICA'S SEARCH FOR TRUTH* by M Meredith. It focuses on the testimony given to the TRC by apartheid era security police regarding the murder of Sizwe Kondile and how his mother rejected Dirk Coetzee's request for forgiveness.

Three senior officers – Van Rensburg, Du Plessis and their commanding officer, Colonel Gerrit Erasmus – eventually admitted to the murder, but denied that Kondile had been killed because he had suffered brain damage during interrogation. The reason for his death, they claimed, was that after agreeing to become a police informer, Kondile had given the name of a security police agent; the name, if it had fallen into the ANC's hands, would have caused severe damage. No longer trusting Kondile, they had decided to kill him. Erasmus admitted making the final decision.

At the end of his testimony, Dirk Coetzee turned towards Charity Kondile to ask for forgiveness, saying he hoped to meet her one day to 'look her in the eye'. Mrs Kondile's lawyer, Imram Moosa, gave a swift response, 'You have said you would like to meet Mrs Kondile and look her in the eye. It is an honour she feels you do not deserve. And if you were really remorseful (sorry), you wouldn't apply for amnesty, but, in fact, stand trial for what you did.'

A long, uncomfortable silence filled the hall. The amnesty panel, the legal representatives, the audience, all seemed distraught (upset). Coetzee turned away slowly, his hands clutched (held) together. In a newspaper interview afterwards, Mrs Kondile said, 'It is easy for Mandela and Tutu to forgive. ... They led vindicated (transformed) lives. In my life nothing, not a single thing, has changed since my son was buried by barbarians (thugs) ... nothing. Therefore, I cannot forgive.'

[From *COMING TO TERMS – SOUTH AFRICA'S SEARCH FOR TRUTH* by M Meredith]

SOURCE 2C

The photograph below was taken at Sizwe Kondile's spiritual repatriation (return). It was published in the Eastern Cape local newspaper, *Eyewitness News*, dated 1 July 2016. It depicts Sizwe Kondile's family members, namely, Bantu Kondile (Sizwe's son), Nompumelelo (Sizwe's sister), Khwezi (Sizwe's nephew) and Pat Kondile (Sizwe's cousin) together with Vusi Pikoli at the site in Komatipoort on 30 June 2016 where they performed his spiritual repatriation (return).



[From *Eyewitness News*, 1 July 2016]

Vusi Pikoli – speaking on behalf of the Kondile family

SOURCE 2D

The article below is from *Independent Online (IOL)*, a South African media platform, dated 2 July 2016. It highlights aspects from the speech of the Minister of Justice and Correctional Services, Michael Masutha, during the burial of Sizwe Kondile's spiritual remains at Freedom Park on 1 July 2016.

CLOSURE AT LAST FOR MURDERED CADRES' FAMILIES

Johannesburg – Poisoned, tortured, shot, burnt and bombed – this was how ..., Sizwe Kondile, ... died at the hands of apartheid police.

The families of the three men achieved a measure of closure as they attended a 'spiritual repatriation' (return) and symbolic burial at Freedom Park in Pretoria on Friday. They were joined by the Minister of Justice and Correctional Services, Michael Masutha, the National Director of Public Prosecutions, Shaun Abrahams, and one of his predecessors, Vusi Pikoli, who had been Kondile's best friend.

On Thursday, the families attended a spiritual repatriation in Komatipoort, Mpumalanga.

The symbolic burial took place at Isivivane in Freedom Park, which can best be described as a spiritual resting place for those who played a part in the struggle. 'We are alive to the fact that there should have been real burials, but the ruthless and merciless apartheid regime had no respect for human life, especially our freedom fighters,' Masutha said. Referring to the ceremony, Masutha said, 'I think it's a moment of reflection for all of us across political persuasions, religious and cultural persuasions and racial divides in South Africa.'

'The Department of Justice hoped to approach Parliament with a concrete proposal to criminalise racism, with jail time as a penalty,' Masutha said.

The ceremony afforded families much-needed closure. Participating in the rituals gave families answers, closure and understanding of the whole situation.

[From *Independent Online (IOL)*, 2 July 2016]

QUESTION 3: WHY WAS THERE RESISTANCE TO WALMART'S EXPANSION INTO SOUTH AFRICA IN 2011?**SOURCE 3A**

The extract below, titled 'Unpacking the Walmart debate – a discussion of the international trade process, issues and implications of Walmart's entry into South Africa', is from the *International Journal of Accounting Research*, Vol. 1, No. 10, 2014, by P Soni and AM Karodia. It highlights how Walmart adopted a globalisation strategy by expanding into South Africa.

Globalisation has offered multinational corporations (MNCs), like Walmart, enormous opportunities in spreading their operations and activities to the far corners of the world. Companies expand their activities across borders for many reasons. Amongst these, access to larger markets, economies of scale and cheaper resources are the most popular reasons for expansion. In Walmart's case, the company's survival was directly linked to its growth, and the international arena provided an ideal platform for sustainable (maintainable) growth.

Walmart could not afford to confine (limit) its operations to a country that accounts for only 4 per cent of the world's population – the USA. As a result, the company began globalising in 1991, and has since aggressively pursued a globalisation strategy.

Although free trade agreements, advances in technology and transportation have made it easier for firms to conduct business across borders, Pearce and Robinson (2011) are of the opinion that there are numerous complexities (difficulties) associated with the international trade process.

Walmart would have also examined the relative 'openness' of South Africa to international trade. Being signatory to the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as well as the recently formed BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) community, has signalled that South Africa is relatively open to trade. Consequently, Walmart settled on South Africa as its first host country on the African continent.

[From *International Journal of Accounting Research*, Vol. 1, No. 10, 2014]

SOURCE 3B

The photograph below is from the *Independent Online (IOL)* newspaper published on 1 June 2011. It shows some members of the South African Commercial and Catering Worker's Union (SACCAWU) demonstrating against the merger of Walmart with Massmart outside the Department of Trade and Industry's offices in Pretoria where the Competition Board hearing was held.

**ANTI-WALMART COALITION****Anti-Walmart coalition
WALMART –
THE ECONOMIC COLONISER!**

SOURCE 3C

The source below is from a submission by the Southern African Clothing and Textile Workers' Union (SACTWU) to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Economic Development on 15 July 2011. It raised concerns on the merger between Walmart stores and Massmart Holdings.

Our primary concern regards the fact that the presence of Walmart will negatively affect local employment and the local manufacturing sector due to decreased demand within the retail sector for locally-produced products and increased demand for imported products (in respect of the merged entity and even its competitors).

This shall have the effect of causing: significant foreclosure (on an industry-wide basis) of domestic manufacturers within the industries which supply the retail sector; job losses, especially in the manufacturing sector but also in the retail sector and particularly amongst black workers; de-industrialisation within the South African manufacturing sector; and small businesses and businesses owned or controlled by historically disadvantaged persons to become less competitive.

The presence of Walmart in the local market will also lead to worsened conditions for employees in the industry. Walmart's practices indicate that its lowering of prices comes at a significant cost to employees, who are compelled to accept lower wages and working conditions. This negates (refuses) any consumer welfare benefits claimed by the merging parties arising out of lowering prices and also raises significant public interest concerns.

[From Walmart Stores INC/Massmart Holdings Limited Submission to Portfolio Committee on Economic Development, 15 July 2011]

SOURCE 3D

The source below is an extract from a speech delivered by Mr Ramburuth, Commissioner of the Competition Commission during a briefing to the Parliamentary Committee on Economic Development on 30 January 2013. It focusses on the impact that the Walmart/Massmart merger would have on local suppliers.

The Walmart/Massmart considerations largely revolved around the threat that was likely in the future. There was a fear that if Walmart came into the country, in view of its sophisticated (modern) network to procure (buy), local suppliers would not have a chance to sell their products. One option was to keep Walmart out of the country. The second – which was followed – was to allow Walmart to enter, but then to build local suppliers to become more efficient and have a greater competitive ability. The supplier development fund and other conditions were articulated (expressed), also in response to interventions by government, which were first announced before the Tribunal.

It was obviously also in the interests of Walmart to have good local supplies, particularly in respect of perishables (food that will lose freshness), and it was likely that Walmart would in any event, even without the order for the establishment of the Fund, have done something to pursue improvement of local supply. Suppliers were not obliged to supply Walmart only, so now they would be improving for all their customers. In relation to the media articles referred to by the chairperson, it seemed that legislators in the USA were taking similar steps to try to protect their own local industries.

Despite its ideological positions, the USA seemed to adopt a protectionist stance. In the long term, the commitment by Walmart might have an impact, depending on how it was implemented, but it must be remembered that no matter what Walmart's commitment in the USA, the political circumstances there could never override the Competition Appeal Court (CAC)'s ruling that it must comply with in South Africa.

[From Parliamentary Monitoring Group, Competition Commission Update,
30 January 2013]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Visual sources and other historical evidence were taken from the following:

Anarcho-Syndicalist Review, an independent labour magazine, 2 October 2017

'Images of Defiance', South African resistance posters of the 1980s produced by Krugersdorp Community Organisation, printed by Screen Training Project in JHB, Raven Press, 2004

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TRC Final Report, Vol. 3, 1998